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Abstract
This paper summarises the experience gained by CST Russian and British staff while brokering and managing
the launches of small satellites in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The seven currently available small launchers
are compared for availability, utility and price. Methods of achieving economical access to space such as piggyback or cluster launches are assessed and guide lines suggested for achieving the best results. CST experiences
with all three basic launch solutions in the FSU and the lessons learned are described.
Including contracts currently in hand, by the end of 2005 CST will have brokered and managed the launches of
over 20 small satellites of 6 to 400 kg mass to a variety of orbits (including GEO) on at least 5 different FSU
launchers. At the moment, none of the satellites will be from the USA. The paper is intended to give some light
on some of the reasons why and suggest possibilities for improving the situation.
The recent record of FSU small launchers will be presented and this and important related issues will be
discussed. The likely evolution of the FSU launcher situation over the next 10 years will be reviewed and 2 or 3
promising developments will be discussed in detail.
the potential use of former ICBMs as commercial
space launchers. Thus, Kazakhstan had a number of
the heavy SS-18s and their launch silos as well as test
silos for the SS-18s and SS-19s at Baikonur.

1. Background
Since the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
much activity on the development of numerous
projects concerned with launch vehicles has taken
place in Russia and Ukraine. It is now possible to say
that the situation in this field has become, while
evolution continues, sufficiently clear and stable at
the present time. Three directions have characterized
activity over the last 10 years, and these were taken
by the Russian and Ukrainian launcher manufacturers
according to their capabilities and potential, which
were mostly inherited from Soviet times.

The basis for the hopes to gain money by the
commercial using of both small launch vehicles and
converted ballistic missiles was, undoubtedly, the
forecasted sharp growth of demand in the world’s
market of launch services for the injection of a huge
number of small communication satellites which were
planned in the frames of large low-orbital satellite
communication system projects, for example,
‘Iridium’, ‘Teledesic’, ‘Globalstar’ etc. When the first
of these systems, ‘Iridium’, was being deployed, the
most advanced Russian converted launch vehicle,
‘Rockot’ was even lucky to capture its share of orders
for injections of some of the system’s satellites which
apparently confirmed the expected opportunities.

Firstly, those companies which had operational
launch vehicles at their disposal, i.e. which were able
to undertake the production and operation of these
launchers, were trying to establish their commercial
operation simultaneously with undertaking rather rare
and badly paid state orders which could not be
refused by these companies since they themselves
were state owned.

However, this also confirmed one more circumstance.
The ‘Rockot’, equipped with an especially developed
upper stage (the development of which had been
begun in the Soviet times) was found to be suitable
for the injections of these modern small
communication satellites while other ready converted
launch vehicles were not suitable for this task, even
the heavy ‘Dnepr’ (SS-18K at that time) was not
suitable without the development of a special upper
stage. These other converted small launch vehicles
had too low lift capacities to service unmodified the
waited boom of small communication satellite
injections. The projects for more complicated
converted launch vehicles having larger lift
capacities, for example, the ‘Priboy/Berkut’ or even
the improved ‘Dnepr’ required significant
investments for their realizations. The bankruptcy of

Secondly, those companies, which had at their
disposal (in the same sense) ballistic missiles
(intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs or
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs) were
trying to convert them into small launch vehicles also
intended for commercial operation. Such an aspiration
for commercial operation was explained by the
circumstance that the FSU (Former Soviet Union)
countries could not be considered good customers of
launchers for their national programmes due to the
difficult economic conditions at that time.
It is necessary to add that, besides Russia and
Ukraine, other FSU countries tried to be involved in
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‘Iridium’ postponed the waited boom for a number of
years and these investments became problematic. At
the same time, the ballistic missiles which would be
converted into effective small launch vehicles had a
time limit, since their production had been halted
while their lifetimes approached inexorably to their
term of expiration.

2. Why FSU Launchers?
Perhaps the first question that should be settled is:
why FSU launchers? The following five nontechnical points alone are enough to explain the
current great interest in FSU launchers, particularly
for launching small satellites.
- Even though now considerably reduced from its
past Soviet glories, FSU space activity is still vast
and multifarious.
- Russian and Ukrainian activity involves a variety
and quantity of launches to all the orbits required
by small satellites (except, perhaps, equatorial).
- Due to the recently tough financial conditions in
the FSU, prices are favourable and companies
eager to please and competitive.
- The de-commissioning of a great many missiles
has led to a flood of ‘conversion’ launchers
- A large number of possibilities for piggy-back
launches are available and there exists a
willingness to adapt major national missions to
this end.

This was the beginning of the end for the ‘period of
FSU converted launchers predominance’. The
situation was complicated by the consequences of the
START
Treaty
implementation:
Kazakhstan
transferred its SS-18s to Russia and destroyed the
silos on its territory and has recently confirmed the
intention to transfer the test silos at Baikonur to be
under the jurisdiction of Russia, while Ukraine, in an
accordance with its obligation to have no offensive
strategic armaments on its territory after December 5,
2001 (although it had a number of removed but not
destroyed ICBMs) has actually abandoned all projects
of converted launch vehicles excluding a participation
in the current commercial operation of the ‘Dnepr’.
A similar situation with converted launch vehicles has
arisen in Russia as well. The projects of such
launchers were either just realized or shelved. An
exception is the ‘Strela’ project, which is near to
realization and will have its first flight soon.

3. FSU Launcher Families and Their Technical
Advantages
What launchers are we actually talking about? There
are now six main classes of launchers in the FSU,
four of which are families derived from an original
single vehicle (all the larger systems). One of these
systems, the super-heavy Energia/Buran, is now
defunct but could be revived given the (unlikely)
circumstance of sufficient demand and money. The
imminent introduction of the ‘Angara’ system (to
replace the Russian Baikonur launched ‘Proton’
system with one of similar or greater capability that
can be launched from Plesetsk) which is modular, like
the Energia launcher, will go some way towards
replacing its capabilities. The larger launchers have
varying potentials for piggy-back rides of small
satellites, and thus the ability to compete with smaller
launchers and converted missiles. The six classes are:
- Energia/Buran system (now defunct)
- Proton/Proton-M (ultimately, Angara 5)
- Soyuz Family (perhaps, Angara 3)
- Zenit 2 (Ukrainian) Zenit 3 (Sea Launch)
- Small Launchers –Cosmos and Tsyklon (soon,
Angara 1)
- Converted Missiles – Shtil, Start, Strela, Rockot,
Dnepr

The third direction was the development of quite new
advanced projects which had no regard to the
conversion of ICBMs/SLBMs.
Initially, almost none of the companies developed
new projects for small launchers. However, most of
the projects which had been initiated in the Soviet
time were abandoned, for example, the 11K55
(‘Vzlyot’), the planned successor for the ‘Cosmos’.
There was only a single exclusion: the ‘Energia’
Rocket Space Corporation (RSC), the largest Russian
space company had no launcher of its own after the
cancellation of the ‘Energia/Buran’ programme and
began to develop the ‘Quant’ project on the basis of
its available technologies.
However, a range of new projects arose in connection
with opportunities for both concrete foreign orders
and the potential for the using of these new launchers
for national space programmes (as a replacement of
old operational launch vehicles). A few of these
projects were led up to the stage of readiness for
hardware manufacturing. Unfortunately, only one of
them is being realized at the present time (‘Angara1’) while the other ones have been shelved like the
above mentioned projects for advanced converted
launchers since the foreign orders were abandoned
while the national space agencies of Russia and
Ukraine have not yet sufficient money for a full-scale
realization of these projects exclusively for their own
purposes.
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There
are
many
technically
advantageous
characteristics of FSU launching systems which lead
to their greater reliability and economy of use. Many
of these characteristics are quite subtle and deserve a
paper of their own. Eight of the main ones are:
- System approach to launcher, launch complex and
operations design
- Long production runs planned at the outset (and
usually achieved). Not preceded by lowest cost
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of a launch is based on that quoted by the
manufacturers (see Section 5).

prototype (as in STS, Ariane-5)
Continuous and large (now mostly past)
investment in engine design and development (use
of efficient engines lowers the mass-fraction of
the launcher)
No-fuss approach, such as the use of railway
transport, introduction of exotic fuels (e.g.,
cryogenic) only when absolutely necessary
Standardisation of launchers, which are non
mission-specific,
which
allows
rapid
turnaround/changes of payload at the cosmodrome
Very experienced launch crews (at least in the
past)
Some new small launchers are ex-missiles, with
military specifications, and even better all weather
capabilities than Soyuz or Proton (which were in
themselves military designs)
Convenience and cost savings associated with the
universal adoption of horizontal integration and
pre-launch testing.

‘Cosmos-3M’
Obsolete but reliable and proven
design. Sufficiently good ranges of
inclinations and sufficiently high payload
masses. However, the available number of
launchers would provide a commercial
operation only for a few more years.
Maximum payload capability is 1.4 tonnes,
price of launch is under US$ 10 mln. See
Figures 1&2.
‘Tsyklon’
Reliable and proven design. Only a
very few remaining launchers are available at
present. Serial production is halted but the
assembly of single launchers is being
continued. There is some potential for the
renewal of serial production and some
projects, such as its use from Alcantara,
Brazil are still being discussed. Maximum
payload capability is about 3.5 tonnes,
reference price of launch is estimated as US$
15-20 mln. See Figure 3.
‘Angara-1.1/1.2’ Advanced new design but using
well proven technology, offering a broad
range of services including, probably, a
range of launch azimuths. However, will be
put into operation only after 2-3 years (but
with a high probability). Maximum payload
capability should be 2.0/3.7 tonnes, reference
price of launch would be at the level of US$
20 mln. See Figure 4. A large range of
heavier launchers will be built up from the
basic Universal Rocket Module (URM) used
and qualified in this launcher.

4. Methods of Economically Launching Small
Satellites
There are three principle ways of reducing the launch
costs of small satellites, dedicated launches on small
launchers, launching satellites in clusters on small
launchers and launching satellites as ‘piggy-backs’
with larger satellites on dedicated missions using
launchers of any size.
4.1. Dedicated Launches
All currently available small launchers and converted
missiles, plus two that are almost certainly to be
introduced soon, are described below. With the
exception of one of these, Angara, all small launchers
were derived from missile projects. However, in the
case of Tsyklon and Cosmos, the launchers have been
developed from missiles from which they are
separated by some distance (both in terms of time and
modifications) and also were manufactured
separately, rather than using decommissioned current
missiles, as with the recent spate of missile
conversions since 1991.

4.1.2. Converted Missiles
The category of converted missiles can be somewhat
confusing until one realises that, as with FSU
launchers in general, these are also in families, each
derived from a current or recent missile system. The
SS-24, from which several quite attractive launching
systems have been designed (such as ‘Space
Clipper’), is unlikely to produce a family as have the
other missiles because of the strict arms limitation
controls and other circumstances placed on it.
However, it is added to the list of four missile types
from which families of launchers are being derived,
below, for completeness.
- SS-25 Family: Start, Start-1: Manufactured by
MIT.
Commercial
company
is
Complex.
Transportable launch base could be used outside
Russia (politics depending). Small capacity, good
launcher with a potential future.
- SS-19 Family: Strela, Rockot, Rockot K,
Eurockot: Manufactured by Khrunichev. Commercial
companies NPO-M and Eurockot respectively.
Dependant on stock but plenty at present.

Thus, FSU small launchers are dealt with in two
separate categories, ‘Current Small Launchers’, and
‘Converted Missiles’. For reasons of price, converted
missiles are the obvious choice where their mass and
orbit capabilities allow. For satellites of under 500 kg,
this method is usually uneconomical (except with
Start and Shtil) and the other methods should be
considered.
4.1.1. Current Small Launchers
The maximum payload capability is given as an
approximate figure for a reference orbit of 200 km
altitude with an inclination of 65o. The reference price
G. Webb
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Fig. 1. Launch of Cosmos no 400 from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on 28th June 2000 carrying the satellite
NADEZHDA (Russian MoD) and 2 ‘piggy-backs’: ‘Tsinghua-1’ (built by SSTL for Tsinghua University) and
SNAP-1 (SSTL). Both ‘piggy-back’ launches were brokered and managed by CST for SSTL.
Photo CST

Fig. 2. Left: CST, SSTL, Rosoboronexport, and Polyot personnel together on the occasion of the signing of the
launch agreement for the SSTL Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) at the Farnborough Air Show in July
2002: - 7 satellites in total on 3 Cosmos launches
Photo Rosoboronexport;
Right: The first satellite in the series, Alsat, is to be launched on 28th November 2002. Photo: - Fit check at
Polyot, September 2002
Photo CST
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Fig. 3. Left: A continuation of the ‘Tsyklon’s’ launches is connected with how existing stocks are used. Yuzhnoye;
Right: The pedigree and versions of the ‘Tsyklon’ launch vehicle: 1 - R-36 (SS-9) ICBM; 2 - Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS); 3 - Tsyklon-2’ two-staged launch vehicle intended for injections of nuclearpowered RORSAT (US-A) satellites; 4, 5 - ‘Tsyklon-2’ for injections of EORSAT (US-P/US-PM) satellites; 6 ‘Tsyklon-2’ for injections of ASAT (IS) satellites; 7 - ‘Tsyklon-3’ three-staged launch vehicle.
Yuzhnoye

Fig. 4. Left: The body of the ‘Angara-1.1’s’ first stage together with ‘old’ (behind) and new composite (in front
plane) fairings in the work-shop of the Khrunichev’s Plant.
Right: Designs of the URM, ‘Angara-1.1’ and ‘Angara-1.2’ (left to right).
Khrunichev

G. Webb
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‘Shtil’/’Volna’ Only for micro payloads. Terms of
launches are in strong dependence on the
navigation plans of the Russian Navy and a
range of inclinations is limited. Very low
launch prices. However, Shtil-2 which may
come into operation in 2-3 years offers
dedicated launchers of minisats up to 250 kg
at piggy-back prices. Maximum payload
capabilities are at present 160 kg with very
restricted payload volume for the ‘Shtil’, and
a few tens of kilograms for the ‘Volna’.
Current launch prices are around US$ 1-2
mln while a ‘Shtil-2’ dedicated launch would
have a price of up to US$ 4-5 mln. See
Figures 9 and 10.

- SS-18 Family: Dnepr (basic version + various
options including US upper stages and versions using
SS-24 technology): Manufactured by Yuzhnoe
Design Bureau (Ukraine). Commercial company is
Kosmotras.
- Navy Missile Family: Shtil, Berkut, Troika
(Riksha, Unity). Projects led by Makeev. Determined
and viable company with interesting technology. No
great success yet. CST is working on launch solutions
involving this family.
- SS-24. A highly advanced solid propellant missile
combining mobility with near Rockot performance.
Would make a very suitable small launcher family but
highly controlled and likely to be destroyed.
The converted missiles are now very briefly
described. Where greater technical description is
required, user’s manuals are available for the
operational launchers. Reference orbit as before, 200
km, 65o.

4.1.3. Future Developments for Converted Missiles
The future viability of converted missiles will depend
on several factors:
1. The numbers of the remaining stocks of those
missiles no longer being manufactured.
2. The state of the remaining stocks of missiles and
other relevant items, particularly with regard to their
serviceable lifetimes.
3. Present and future competition from other
launchers.
4. Political agreements.

‘Dnepr’ Has now been put into commercial operation
and has a good lift capacity comparable with
‘Cosmos’ and ‘Rockot’ with a low launch
price. Limited range of inclinations, but will
be able to go to SSO from the CST brokered
Demeter Launch in 2004. Confirmed
capability of micro/mini-satellites ‘cluster’
launches. Maximum payload capability is
higher than 3 tonnes (could be enhanced up
to 4.4 tonnes), launch price with a complete
payload would be near US$ 10 mln in
unmodified form, but will be higher if upper
stages are used. See Figure 5.

For the SS-18 and SS-19 derived launchers (Dnepr,
Rockot and Strela), at the current rate of use, factor 2
is likely to predominate over factor 1 in assessing the
time when they cease use.
Until recently, the Start treaty placed a limit (absolute
in the case of Dnepr) at 2007, but since 2002, when
the United States declined to ratify it, this treaty has
lapsed. However, the ‘extra life’ gained as a
consequence by the SS-18s and 19s will only be about
5 years, i.e. to about 2012 until age and decrepitude
begin to make the entire stock of missiles uneconomic
to use. (Kosmotras has said that the SS-18 could be
‘re-lifed’ to 2020.)

‘Rockot’ Is now in commercial operation. A broad
range of injection services. A capacity for
constellation deployment. The launcher is
also offered in a package with the ‘Yacht’
space bus. Maximum payload capability is
1.9 tonnes, price of launch is US$ 12-15 mln.
See Figure 6.

The converted launchers that will undoubtedly benefit
from this demise will be Start and Shtil whose basic
missile components are still in manufacture and
therefore are still viable until at least 2020. Both also
have another potential survival characteristic: their
smallness and cheapness.

‘Strela’ High probability to be put into operation
soon. Potentially relatively low prices, but
narrow ranges of orbit altitudes and rather
low lift capacity. Besides, it probably will be
used mostly for the developer’s dedicated
missions. Maximum payload capability
would be at the level of 1.4 - 1.5 tonnes,
reference launch price would not exceed US$
10 mln. See Figure 7.

While the SS-18 and 19 missile conversions will soon
face competition from new especially designed
commercial launchers such as Angara 1, they are
cheap enough to survive and even compete with Start
and Shtil. However, after 2012 these very light
launchers will fulfil a niche that the custom-built
launchers will be unable to service at the same price,
i.e. the one of dedicated launchers for satellites of up
to a few hundred kilograms mass, and will therefore
come into their own.

‘Start-1’/’Start’ In operation. Broad range of orbit
inclinations but low lift capacity. Can be
launched from foreign territories. Maximum
payload capability is approximately 0.6/0.9
tonnes, reference price of launch is US$ 8
mln. See Figure 8.

G. Webb
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Fig. 5. The ‘Dnepr’ LV. Left: The demonstration launch of the ‘Dnepr’ LV with the British UoSat-12 satellite
built by SSTL, 21.04.99. Launch arranged by CST.
KOSMOTRAS
Right: An SS-18, which will be used as the ‘Dnepr’ launch vehicle for commercial launchers of small satellites,
being installed into a silo.
ROSAVIACOSMOS

Fig. 6. Left: The pedigree and versions of the ‘Rockot’ launch vehicle: 1 – SS-19 ICBM; 2 – initial version of
‘Rockot’ with ‘Breeze-K’ and ‘old’ fairing; 3 – current ‘Rockot’ with ‘Breeze-KM’ and new composite fairing;
Right: Assembling the ‘Breeze-KM’ upper stage, the improved version of ‘Breeze-K’, for the first flight example
of the commercial ‘Rockot’
Khrunichev
G. Webb
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Fig. 7. Top: The evolution of the 'Rockot' and 'Strela’' from the SS-19;
Bottom: Beginning of work on the former SS-11 silo for the 'Strela' launchers at Svobodny NPO Mashinostroyenia

Fig. 8. Left: The ‘Topol’ road-transportable ICBM
Right: The Swedish ‘Odin’ satellite injected by the ‘Start-1’

G. Webb
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Fig. 9. Left: The ‘Shtil’ family of launch vehicles converted from the SS-N-23 (RSM-54) SLBM, from left to
right: ‘Shtil-1’, ‘Shtil-2.1’, ‘Shtil-2’, ‘Shtil-3’
Right: German customers used the ‘Shtil-1’ (SS-N-23) (left) for the orbital launch of ‘Tubsat’ satellites from the
‘Novomoskovsk’ nuclear submarine (right). 1 - head unit; 2 - instrumental compartment; 3 - warheads or
payloads; 4,5,6 - main rocket engines of stages
SRC Makeyev

Fig. 10. Left: The ‘Volna’ launch vehicle converted from the SS-N-20 (RSM-50) SLBM;
Right: Loading the ‘Volna’ into a submarine before the launch of the ‘Cosmos-1’ spacecraft
G. Webb
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would be more simply realized at the territories of
such countries as Brazil, SAR and, probably, even
Australia, especially in regard to launch vehicles
which are not under the jurisdiction of the START
Treaty (special measures were foreseen for converted
ICBMs/SLBMs, especially mobile ICBMs, for their
safeguarding during operation at the territories of
foreign countries).

Thus, provided that factor 4 does not come into play
for some reason not yet apparent, the future for
missile conversions, whatever the total market
demand may be, contains a definite bridge-point in
about 10 years time.
4.1.4. Political Restrictions on Small Launchers
(Notes on problems concerned with the danger of the
potential use for terrorist actions of certain launch
systems.)

It can be supposed that such a seizure is possible.
However, there are significant problems which
prevent the use of any small launch vehicle for a
terrorist attack against a target. First of all,
calculations and a change of software should be
necessary as well as a completion of the pre-launch
preparation. The methods and technologies for
operation would be available for terrorists only in the
cases when a launch vehicle of the non-converted
type was developed or delivered especially for an
operation from the country of a customer (such as the
‘Unity’ project). The according documentation would
be received in an illegal way in the customer country,
which might have insufficient experience for
safeguarding this documentation. A compulsion of the
servicing personnel to carry out necessary operations
would have to be made by the terrorists as well. (This
would take place in regard of the carrier aircraft’s
crew in the case of air-launched systems). Moreover,
there would be an alternative between life and death
in the case of meeting the terrorists’ requirements
(instead of an unavoidable death in the method which
was used by the terrorists on September 11, 2001 in
regard to the captured airplanes’ crews).

A number of the START Treaty’s articles as well as
the Missile Technology Control Regime are directed
to an elimination of the danger concerned with the
falling of strategic offensive armaments, primarily
ballistic missiles or the technologies for their creation,
into the hands of so called ‘rogue-countries’ i.e.
countries, the governments of which are adhering to a
policy grounded-on or allowing terrorist actions
against other countries. The United States are
especially vigorous in pursuing the exact
implementation of these articles, sometimes even
exceeding reasonable limits. However, the terrible
events of September 11, 2001 have shown that these
apprehensions were not groundless. Moreover, it has
become evident that the executors of such large-scale
terrorist actions could be secret international terrorist
organizations having more capacities, both financial
and technical, than some separate ‘rogue-countries’.
In a view of the recent events it is reasonable to
examine even in a preliminary fashion, the danger
which could be created by the use of small launch
vehicles as tools for terrorist attacks.

The next problem is a more serious one for terrorists.
The head units of small launch vehicles (i.e. the units,
which consist of the payload, its fairing and, in some
cases, upper stages) could not be considered any
substitute for a warhead: firstly, nose fairings are not
designed for entering into dense layers of atmosphere
with high velocities. Hence, even in the case of the
command for the ejection of the fairing being
eliminated, the head unit will still be destroyed before
the hit of the target. Secondly, even modern ICBMs
and SLBMs cannot provide an accuracy of such a hit
of less than a hundred meters without the using of
additional targeting by the warhead’s special homing
systems.

Indeed, all the small launch vehicles are nearer to
ballistic missiles than the launch vehicles of other
classes thanks to their dimensions and masses and the
times of pre-launch preparation. Moreover, a number
of them are solid-propellant ones or are using storable
propellants, which enhances even more their
readiness for launch (not without a reason, since they
were converted from military ballistic missiles).
Thanks to these features, really, a certain number of
current small launch vehicles could be used as the
means for the deliveries of warheads to targets with a
quick change of the control system’s software during
a short period after a potential seizure of a launch site
by groups of terrorists.

Hence, terrorists should have to have a warhead
which should be installed onto a captured launch
vehicle and this warhead should be compatible with
the launcher’s payload adapter and the system for
payload separation.

Such seizures are more possible for mobile launch
vehicles, which would be located at temporary launch
sites or intermediate airfields (for air-launch systems),
situated in the territories of Third World’s countries.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that terrorist groups
could capture the launch sites at the well-guarded
spaceports of the United States or, especially, Russia
where even the routine servicing of launchers is being
provided by the militaries. However, these seizures
G. Webb
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the basis of the launcher’s documentation received in
either legal (as a potential customer) or illegal ways.
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use of this warhead without a significant volume of
preceding testing in real flights. This is an uncertain
enterprise, in comparison with which even an attempt
to seize a real ICBM can be considered as having
more chances for success.

suitable to be used for terrorist purposes are those
which are launched from the territories of foreign
countries, especially countries of Third World, and,
secondly, non-converted launchers are the most
probable candidates to be used for these purposes
since their documentation is more available than for
converted ones.

No.

Date

Launch
vehicle

Spaceport

1

21.04.99

Dnepr

Baikonur

2

28.04.99

Cosmos

Kapustin
Yar

3

26.08.99

4

26.12.99 Tsyklon-2 Baikonur

1

2

3

4

16.05.00

28.06.00

15.07.00

26.09.00

Cosmos

Rockot

Cosmos

Cosmos

Dnepr

5

20.11.00

Cosmos

6

05.12.00

Start-1
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Plesetsk

Plesetsk

Plesetsk

Plesetsk

Baikonur

Plesetsk

Orbit
Payload
Height, Inclina(Country)
tion,
km
deg.
1999
UoSAT-12
Circ. 660
64.5
(UK)
ABRIXAS
550×559
48.5
(Germany)
Megsat-O
548×605
48.5
(Italy)
Cosmos-2366
/Parus/
984×1021
82.9
(Russia)
Cosmos-2367
/EORSAT/
415×428
65.0
(Russia)
2000
SIMSAT-1
538×559
86.4
(Russia)
SIMSAT-2
540×553
86.4
(Russia)
Nadezhda
685×727
98.12
(Russia)
TSINGHUA-1
686×728
98.12
(China)
SNAP-1
685×725
98.13
(UK)
MITA
424×485
87.27
(Italy)
CHAMP
429×485
87.27
(Germany)
TIUNGSAT-1
644×670 64.56
(Malaysia)
MEGSAT-1
642×667 64.56
(Italy)
UNISAT
644×688 64.56
(Italy)
SaudiSat-1A
/SO-41/
643×680 64.56
(Saud. Arab.)
SaudiSat-1B
/SO-42/
644×683 64.56
(Saud. Arab.)
Quick Bird-1
(USA)
-

Svobodny 496×534

EROS A1
(Israel)

97.32
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Mass of
payload
in orbit

Nevertheless, attempts at even the most unbelievably
shady enterprises can be found in the newest history.
Hence, the examined danger should not be neglected
altogether. Rather, it merits a special study. At the
present time, it is possible to note two preliminary
4.1.5. Tables of Recent and Future Launches of
statements: firstly, the small launchers which are most
FSU Small Launch Vehicles
Table 1
RECENT LAUNCHES
Purpose

Notes

325

Test

Brokered by CST

550

Scientific

Experimental
(communication)
Military
navigation/
800
communication

-

35

3150

657
660
800
49
8.3

Ocean
reconnaissance

-

Demonstration Payloads were
mass/dimensional
Demonstration mock-ups of ‘Iridium’
satellites
Rescue
(COSPAS-9)
Chinese and UK
satellite launches
ERS
brokered by CST
Test

169.9

Test/scientific

522.2

Scientific

54

ERS

54

Communication

10

Scientific

10

Test/
communication

10

Test/
communication

Non-separable ‘BirdRubin’ was installed
in second
stage as well
Management by CST

981

ERS

Failure of launcher
due to premature shutdown of 2nd stage
engine

250

ERS

-
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-

Gonets D1
Gonets D1
Gonets D1
Strela 3
Strela 3
Strela 3
(Russia)
2001
Odin
97.8
(Sweden)

7

27.12.00 Tsyklon-3 Plesetsk

1

20.02.01

Start-1

2

08.06.01

Cosmos

Plesetsk

981×1023

82.9

3

20.07.01

Volna

Barents
Sea (from
submarine)

-

-

4

31.07.01 Tsyklon-3 Plesetsk

501×549

82.5

5

21.12.01 Tsyklon-2 Baikonur

412×421

65

6

1421×1448
1420×1447
1419×1447
28.12.01 Tsyklon-3 Plesetsk 1418×1447
1415×1447
1408×1445

1

17.03.02

Rockot

Plesetsk

496×521
496×522

89.0
89.0

2

28.05.02

Cosmos

Plesetsk

970×1029

82.96

Circ. 650

86.35

3

20.06.02

Rockot

Plesetsk

Circ. 650

86.35

1480x1526

82.21

4

8.07.02

Cosmos

Plesetsk
1481x1517

82.42

Svobodny 615×650

5

12.07.02

Volna

Barents
Sea

6

26.09.02

Cosmos

Plesetsk

984x1030

7

28.10.02

Cosmos

Plesetsk

8

1

20.12.02

4.06.03

G. Webb

Dnepr

Cosmos

Baikonur

Plesetsk

82.5
82.5
82.5
82.5
82.5
82.5

230
230
230
230
230
230

Communication
Communication
Failure of launcher
Communication
due to emergency
Military comm.
shut-down of 3rd stage
Military comm.
engine
Military comm.

250

Scientific

-

Cosmos-2378
(Russia)

800

Military
navigation/
communication

-

Cosmos-1
(USA)

40

Failure. Satellite did
Experimental not separate from
launcher

Koronas-F
2260
Scientific
(Russia/Ukraine)
Cosmos-2383
Ocean
/EORSAT/
3150
reconnaissance
(Russia)
?
Military comm.
Cosmos-2384
?
Military comm.
Cosmos-2384
?
Military comm.
Cosmos-2384
Gonets-D1 No. 10 230 Communication
Gonets-D1 No. 11 230 Communication
Gonets-D1 No. 12 230 Communication
(Russia)
2002
GRACE-1
496
Scientific
GRACE-1
496
Scientific
(USA/Germ.)
Military
Cosmos-2389
800
navigation/
(Russia)
communication
Iridium-97
683 Communication
Iridium-98
686 Communication
(USA)
Cosmos-2390
200
(Russia)
Military
communication
Cosmos-2390
200
(Russia)
Demonstrator-2
(Russia/Germany)

146

82.9

Nadezhda-M

800

691x772
694x774

98.24
98.24

69
90
30

638x688

64.56

10

638x687

64.56

Scientific

15

Test/comm..

636x709
640x678
635x720

64.56
64.56
64.56

10
10

Test/comm..
Test/comm..

641x668

64.56

Mozhaets
AlSat-1
Rubin-2
(Germany)
UNISAT-2
(Italy)
SaudiSat-1С
(Saud. Arab.)
LatinSat-A
LatinSat-B
(USA)
Dummy of
TrailBlaser
(USA)
2003

COSPASSARSAT
Educational
DMC
Test/comm..

1000

83

Sub-orbital

Military SC

12

Experimental

-

-

-

Failure. Spacecraft
was not found
Alsat launch brokered
by CST

420

-

-

(TBD)
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No.

Launch
vehicle

1

Rockot

2

Cosmos

3
4

Strela
Strela

5

Tsyklon-3

6

Tsyklon-2

7

Rockot

8

Volna

9

Rockot

10

Shtil

11

Shtil

12

Shtil

13

Dnepr

14

Dnepr

15

Start-1

16

Cosmos

17

Rockot

18

Rockot

19

Start-1

G. Webb

Table 2
KNOWN PLANNED LAUNCHES FOR 2003-2005
Spacecraft
Sort of orbit
Purpose
Planned term
of launch
(Country)
MOST
LEO
Scientific
(Canada)
MIMOSA
LEO
Experimental
(Czech)
CubeSat XI-IV
(Japan)
CUTE-I
(Japan)
650 km
Scientific
June 2003
CanX-1
SSO
(Canada)
AAU CubeSat
(Denmark)
DTUSat
(Denmark)
QuakeSat
(USA)
BILSAT (~100
kg) (Turkey)
Disaster
monitoring
Nigeriasat (~90
kg) (Nigeria)
LEO (686 km
III - 2003
SSO)
UK DMC (~90
kg) (UK)
ERS
KaistSat – 4
(S. Korea)
III - 2003
Late 2003
Sich-1M
Disaster
LEO
III - 2003
(Ukraine)
monitoring
Cosmos
Late 2003
Monitor-E
LEO
ERS
Late 2003
(Russia)
Cosmos-1
LEO
Experimental
Late 2003
(USA)
September –
Service - 1
SSO
Communication
October 2003
KybSat
Scientific
2003
(Germany)
Compas-2
LEO
Scientific
Late 2003
(Russia)
Compas-3
LEO
Scientific
Early 2004
(Russia)
Demeter
SSO - 700
Scientific
April 2004
(French)
TrailBlazer
Scientific
Moon orbit
2004
(USA)
EROS-B1
LEO
ERS
2004
(Israel)
TOPSAT (~125
kg) (UK)
Chinasat (120-140
LEO (686 km
Disaster
End 2004
kg) (China)
SSO)
monitoring
VNSAT (120-140
kg) (Vietnam)
KOMPSat-2
685
ERS
Late 2004
(South Korea)
SSO
CryoSat
Scientific
2004
(French)
EROS-3
(Israel)

Note

DMC 2nd launch
managed by CST

From Baikonur
From Svobodny

Foreseen realization of
option

Launches will be
carried out if ‘Compas’
concept confirmed
CNES satellite, being
managed by CST
-

DMC 3rd launch being
managed by CST

LEO

ERS
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said about the ‘Proton’ and ‘Zenit-3’ launch vehicles
equipped with versions of the ‘Block-DM’ upper
stage. However the ‘Block-DM’, thanks to its large
size, has suitable places on its structure and adaptor
and CST now has the authority to arrange the direct
injection into GEO of piggy-back payloads of up to
400 kg, e.g. GEMINI, see Figure 12.

4.2. Cluster Launching and Piggy-Backing
The space launch vehicles of the former Soviet Union
were used, on occasion, for, piggy-back payload
injections. This kind of insertion into orbit is best for
so called nano- and micro-satellites having masses of
kilograms and tens of kilograms. Indeed, it would be
too expensive to use especially ordered launchers,
even of the super-small class such as the American
‘Pegasus’ or Russian ‘Start’, for such missions.
Examples of such missions can be found only among
the test flights of the new launchers or launches of
national satellites by launch vehicles from the same
nations. Nowadays, such kind of service as the
assembling of a ‘cluster’ of a sufficient number of
micro-satellites in order to provide a commercially
profitable multiple injection of them with a single
launcher is just being offered (e.g., through CST) and
has been just twice implemented for the ‘Dnepr’
launcher, for example.

The ‘Rockot’, being equipped with the ‘Breeze-KM’
upper stage, has an opportunity to provide the
injections of multiple piggy-back payloads in
accordance with the ‘Launch a Piggy’ Programme
which was announced by the ‘Eurockot’ company in
October, 2000. It was reported that the standard
dispenser of the ‘Breeze-KM’ upper stage would
accommodate from 2 to 7 piggy-back micro/minisatellites of masses from 50 to 250 kg. The price of
the piggy-back injection per kilo would be US$ 10-15
thousand, as it was announced. Thanks to the
relatively high power potential of the ‘Breeze-KM’,
these piggy-back payloads would be delivered into an
orbit, the height of which could differ from the orbit
of the prime payload. However, all the piggy-back
payloads should be separated simultaneously. Every
piggy-back satellite should be installed onto a special
spacer of 300x300 mm size and should be fastened at
four points. No electrical interfaces are provided by
the dispenser.

Nevertheless, a lot of launches are carried out with
incomplete loading i.e. the launchers in these
missions have reserves of lift capacity which could be
used for the gaining of additional money (important
for FSU organisations) through the injections of
piggy-back payloads. Hence, any launch vehicle, even
of heavy class, which is fulfilling a mission of such an
injection, can be considered as a vehicle
implementing the function of a small launcher with
regard to this payload. Hence ‘Zenit’, when on
Russian national missions, is a popular ‘piggy-back’
carrier.

The first launch in the ‘Launch a Piggy’ (LAP-1) is
scheduled for 2003 when the ‘Monitor-E’ Russian
satellite should be injected as a prime payload
together with the MOST and MIMOSA piggy-backs.
The prime satellite should be injected into a sunsynchronous orbit with heights 550-700 km.
However, further customers for this sort of launch
service have not been found yet, and therefore the
‘Launch a Piggy’ programme is now in some doubt.
Assembling diverse payloads into a single cluster
bunch is not a simple task and this concept was
offered by Eurockot as a competition ploy to
Kosmotras, the marketers of Dnepr, without realising
that they had also run into some serious problems
with the concept. Since the Dnepr is fundamentally
cheaper than Eurockot (without an elaborate upper
stage similar to the Breeze-KM) this ploy may
backfire. A Dnepr cluster launch is shown in Figure
13. Kosmotras is more likely to make the cluster
concept work and now appears to have succeeded.

However, a detailed examination of Soviet/FSU
experience in this field leads to a surprising result.
Despite the fact that this experience has a history
beginning from 1972, when the French SRET-1 was
injected by the ‘Molniya’ launcher, up to the present,
until recently no piggy-back payloads were separated
directly from the top (upper) stage of the launch
vehicle! All of them were attached to and separated
from the various satellites which were the primary
payloads in the concerned missions. Hence, one
should talk about piggy-back payloads from
spacecraft rather than launchers. A logistical
complication, which CST has overcome for its
customers, is that such a piggy-back mission is
usually arranged with the main satellite manufacturer,
rather than the launcher organisation. Examples of
this arrangement are the first two CST launches given
in Table 3. The Zenit launcher, with Fasat Alpha and
TMSat is shown in Figure 11.

Since the ‘Breeze-KM’ and ‘Breeze-M’ upper stage
have very near designs, apparently, piggy-back
payloads could be injected also by the heavy ‘ProtonM’ and ‘Angara’ with the ‘Breeze-M’. This upper
stage will apparently have an additional opportunity
to install piggy-back payloads on the ejected
propellant tank (they would be separated together
with this tank, followed by their own separation).
CST’s arrangements for GEMINI also cover BreezeM.

The heavier ‘Sojuz’/‘Molniya’ and ‘Tsyklon’ were
never considered for the direct injection of piggyback payloads and, apparently, it would be hard to
arrange for this purpose since they have no free
volumes between their top/upper stages and installed
adapters with the main payloads. The same might be
G. Webb
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Fig. 11. Top: The installation of the ‘FASat-Bravo’ and SAFIR-2 satellites on the ‘Resurse-01’ satellite.
Bottom: The installation of the WESTPAC, ‘TM-Sat’ and ‘Techsat’ satellites on the ‘Resurse-01’ satellite.

Universal

“Express-AK”
“Express-AK”
Cluster

Separation system

“Packed” arrangement of S/C inside upper unit
Upper unit with SC and upper stage arrangement
Fig. 12. Left: Piggy-Back to GEO - CST is making arrangements with Rosaviakosmos for the launch of small
satellites direct to GEO by piggy-backing on a Russian national satellite launch on Proton. Arrangements can be
made for other satellites of up to 400 kg very economically (~ 20K US dollars/kg); Right: Cluster to GEO Cluster launches can also be arranged for GEO small satellites above 400 kg, up to about 800 kg. Above this
mass, occasional opportunities arise in the form of specially arranged ‘test’ launches on behalf of federal bodies.
G. Webb
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Fig. 13. Dnepr cluster launch
Meanwhile both Cosmos (recently) and Dnepr
(soon) can now perform sun-synchronous
injections. The first Cosmos to SSO was with
SSTL-built Tsinghua-1 (+SNAP) and the first SSO
flight of Dnepr will be with CNES-built Demeter,

KOSMOTRAS

both satellites being under CST launcher brokerage
services. Figure 14 shows the mounting structure
and preparation for the launch of Tsinghua-1 and
SNAP-1.

Fig. 14. Fit-check for Tsinghua-1 and SNAP-1, May 2000 with NADEZHDA satellite, showing mounting
structure (equivalent to ASAP).
G. Webb
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local management on the spot and the conducting of
progress meetings and handling bureaucratic
processes for clients, which can save a great deal of
time as well as money for users of FSU launch
services. The most important stage in which extra
savings can be achieved is in the construction of the
launch services contract and this stage includes CST’s
interpretation and translation skills as well as its
understanding of Russian approach, which is also
vital. A close examination of all aspects of FSU space
industry and technology should also enable potential
customers to assess the technologies, stocks,
associations, current situation and ability to do
business of the organisations that they wish to deal
with.

5. Practical Questions
CST Experience
Of CST’s specialisations, the one relevant to this
paper is FSU launcher services brokering. Table 3
summarises CST’s experience in this field.
Pricing
The most important competitors for the small FSU
launchers listed in Section 4 are actually other FSU
launchers. While such competition exists (and it
always will, in some form or other) it is possible to
broker in a straightforward way ‘across the board’ for
both ‘piggy-back’ and dedicated launch services,
achieving the best achievable prices and conditions.
CST usually manages to achieve further savings by

Table 3
HISTORY OF CST LAUNCH ARRANGEMENTS
Completed
1995 August 31
1998 July10
1999 April 21
2000 June 28
2000 September 26
2002 November 28
Future Schedule
2003 September
2004
2005

April
July
First half

Tsyklon (1 piggy-back)
Zenit (2 piggy-back)
Dnepr (1 dedicated)
Cosmos (2 piggy-back payloads)
Dnepr (1 piggy-back payload)
Cosmos (1 piggy-back)
Cosmos (3 in cluster)
Dnepr (main in cluster)
Cosmos (2 in cluster)
Proton (1 piggy-back)

2006

NigeriaSat-1, BilSat-1 and
UK-DMC/DMC-2
Demeter
TopSat+ChinaSat/DMC-3
Gemini-1
Other satellites
Others either scheduled or in negotiation
Western business methods and culture for a relatively
short time, there remain a lot of perceptual problems,
strange bureaucratic procedures, unusual taxes, odd
travel arrangements and peculiar customs. This is
compensated by a strong native sense of humour, a
natural anarchy and an ability to imbibe large
quantities!

By a combination of all of the price saving methods
discussed above, CST has always managed to achieve
significant (sometimes dramatic) overall reductions
on basic launch price quotations. CST’s key to
success depends mainly on a well integrated, trusted
and specialised team of Russian employees to handle
negotiations plus an expert technical team to handle
questions as they arise during the working process.

To satisfy the usual questions that customers ask,
CST finds it very helpful to supply customers at an
early stage with the latest edition of its ‘Guide to
Launching Small Satellites in the Countries of the
Former Soviet Union’, now in its 7th edition.

Problems
Linguistic difficulties are actually less important than
those with cultural perceptions. Since the
organisations involved have only been exposed to

G. Webb

Fasat Alpha
Fasat Bravo + TM sat
Uo Sat 12
Tsinghua 1+Snap
Tiung Sat
Alsat/DMC-1
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